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1 Introduction
The Adaptation Fund was established under the
Kyoto Protocol to assist vulnerable developing
countries in the implementation of concrete
adaptation projects and programmes. The Fund
was originally agreed during the 7th Conference
of the Parties (COP7) to the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) held
in Marrakesh, Morocco, in 2001, but it wasn’t
until 2007 at COP13 that the Adaptation Fund
Board (AFB) was established to design and
govern the Fund. In 2010, the Fund became fully
operational for financing implementation of
adaptation initiatives and is now an institution
with a particular role in the international
climate finance arena.
Table 1 gives an overview of the total revenues of
the organisation and the key projects funded per
country. Its particular features make the Fund
stand out from other climate change financing
mechanisms: it operates under the authority of
the UNFCCC country Parties at COP; there is
opportunity for direct access of funds rather than
through a UN implementing agency; the
governance structure has a majority of
developing country representatives; the levy on
the trading of carbon credits (Certified Emission
Reductions (CERs)) under the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) provides an
innovative funding source; and it has the
strategic priority to give special attention to
most vulnerable communities (Chandani et al.
2009).
Understanding the political economy of climate
change as processes by which ideas, power and
resources are conceptualised, negotiated and
implemented at different scales in climate
change initiatives, this article examines three
different aspects of political economy of the Fund:
z The role of the Fund in the international
policy arena, including power relationships
with other institutions such as the Global
Environment Facility (GEF) or the World
Bank;
z Governance in the AFB, including the role of
its members’ interests in specific decision-
making;
z Inclusiveness and distribution of
responsibilities regarding project
implementation by developing countries.
This article argues that the political economy of
the Fund has been of vital importance since its
establishment, and as it begins to implement
projects, the more levels of powers and interests
of certain stakeholders are apparent. This holds
for the international institutional competition, as
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well as for the implementation within developing
countries, where the relationship between
governments and non-governmental stakeholders
are crucial.
While it is too early to draw conclusions
regarding the implementation of the Fund,
highlighting relevant issues at this early stage
can help identify benchmarks against which
future development of it can be measured. Our
analysis demonstrates that it is important for the
AFB to actively address political economy
aspects. Potentially useful measures include a
greater transparency on the project and
programme decisions and clearer guidelines for
governments to include non-governmental
stakeholders in the project cycle.
2 Political economy at the international level:
origins and the future of the Fund
After some progress had been reached at the
climate summit held in 2006 in Nairobi (see
Müller 2006), the following year’s UNFCCC
summit in Bali resulted in a breakthrough
decision, which allowed the AFB to start its work.
However, this decision could only be achieved
after considerable controversy. The Bali meeting
agreed to set up the Adaptation Fund under the
authority of the COP (the governing body of the
UNFCCC), with the AFB functioning as the
operating entity of the Fund and with a developing
country majority membership, including special
seats for least developed countries (LDCs) and
small island developing states (SIDS).1 The World
Bank would serve as the Trustee, with very
restricted functions. It thereby reflected many of
the positions expressed previously by key
negotiators from LDCs and small island countries
(Abdullah et al. 2006; Sopoaga et al. 2007).
In the centre of these discussions was the role of
the GEF, which was proposed variously by the
EU, Japan, Canada and Switzerland as the
Fund’s managing entity as early as 2006
(UNFCCC 2006). However, many developing
countries, especially the LDCs, but also the
Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), had
several reservations based in particular on their
previous experiences of projects and governance
of the GEF (Tuvalu 2006; Pew Center 2007).
Furthermore, the Philippines strongly objected
to the influence of the USA in the GEF when it
was not a Kyoto Protocol signatory (UNFCCC
2006). According to various UNFCCC delegates,
the GEF lobbied during the Bali summit to
obtain a strong role in the Fund (ECO 2007).
Eventually, the GEF was invited to serve as the
secretariat on an interim basis and not as the
operating entity of the Fund itself, which left the
GEF with a significantly weaker role than in the
other funds operated under the Convention.
Reflecting the debate prior to Bali, there seems
to have been convergence towards the view that
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Table 1 The Adaptation Fund – facts and figures (as of 28 March 2011)
Resource status
Revenues from CER monetisation (as of 31 October 2010) ca. US$130m
Projected overall CER revenues (by 31 December 2012) ca. US$288–401m (estimate)
Voluntary donations from developed countries (as of 31 December 2010) ca. US$100m (pledged)
Project level decisions
Full projects approved 7 Senegal, Honduras, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Ecuador, Eritrea, Solomon Islands 
Project concepts approved 8 Cook Islands, El Salvador, Georgia, Guatemala, Madagascar, Maldives, 
Mongolia, Uruguay
Project concepts not endorsed 10 Egypt, Fiji, India, Mauritania, Mauritius, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Uganda,
or approved Tanzania, Turkmenistan 
Funding decisions (full projects) US$49.4m
Implementing entities (IEs) accredited
National IE (direct access) 3 Senegal, Jamaica, Uruguay 
Multilateral IE 7 ADB, IFAD, UNDP, UNEP, WFP, World Bank, WMO
Source Own compilation, based on Germanwatch (2010). 
the particular niche of the Adaptation Fund
should be to fund concrete project activities
(albeit not necessarily as an exclusive focus)
(UNFCCC 2006). This view was also shared by
developed countries, who nevertheless stressed
the importance of funding such activities in an
integrated manner consistent with national
policies. One of the key arguments in favour of
the GEF was the perception that only the
operation by the same entity would ensure
avoiding duplication across funds. The GEF as an
entity linked to several Multilateral
Environmental Agreements was also expected to
ensure better the consistency of national policies
and to avoid ‘standalone’ approaches. In
contrast, the new features of the Fund in the
view of developing countries justified that ‘the
Fund is in a league of its own, and that it is
sufficiently different from the other funds to
necessitate the creation of a “standalone”
governance structure with an entirely new
operating body’ (Sopoaga et al. 2007). This shows
that the key reasons for the developing countries
to fight for the independent Fund were more the
desire for establishing structures independent of
the conventional, donor-driven finance
architecture, including based on the argument
that adaptation is rather restitution than
development aid, than the nature of concrete
adaptation as such compared to the need for
mainstreaming.
When the AFB started its work in March 2008,
the relationship to the GEF was still influenced
by these tensions. The AFB made it clear that
the Fund is not operating under GEF rules, but
had to design its own rules. The challenge was
that it was GEF staff that provided draft
documents on several issues in their role as the
provider of secretariat services. However, since
then, a solid working relationship has been
established, with the GEF accepting its
subordinated role, but nonetheless making
available its important endogenous expertise, for
example with regard to the review of projects
and programmes.
Since these early tensions, as the Fund has become
an established and operational institution, its role
in the overall climate finance landscape has
become far more relevant. Currently, there are
three multilateral funds which have adaptation as
their key objective. Each of them are supposed to
perform different functions:
z The Adaptation Fund, set up under the Kyoto
Protocol under the UNFCCC, which is to
finance concrete adaptation projects and
programmes;
z The Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) set
up under the UNFCCC and operated by the
GEF; its focus is to assist the 48 LDCs in the
preparation and implementation of National
Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs).
Fed by voluntary pledges, the available
resources are significantly less than would be
required to implement the NAPAs in full;
z The Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR)
within the Climate Investment Funds set up
under the World Bank, with the purpose to
finance pilot programmes for integrating
adaptation into national planning. Currently,
it addresses nine countries and two additional
regions. The Fund was set up outside the
UNFCCC process, but through contributions
by donor countries, it has become by far the
largest adaptation-related multilateral fund
(see Seballos and Kreft; Ayers et al.; Shankland
and Chambote; all in this IDS Bulletin).
In terms of political economy, the most relevant
aspect today is why the Fund is the one which has
received the smallest amount of donor
contributions (see Kaloga 2010, for an overview).
There are a variety of different reasons:
z The Fund was intended to be funded by a levy
on transactions in the CDM and thereby to be
independent and self-standing; some
developed countries argue that adding
voluntary contributions might cause
interference with this independence; however,
at low carbon prices the CDM levy alone does
not generate sufficient resources.
z Most of the donor countries were not happy
with the innovative features of the Fund (but
had to give in because of the political pressure
at COP13 in Bali), so they were hesitant in
supporting the Fund early on.
z The Fund utilises a new kind of institutional
arrangement, where it was not clear if and
when it would prove successful.
z The Fund’s focus on separate projects and
programmes does not reflect the funding
preferences of donor countries which give
more priority to climate proofing of
investments and mainstreaming of adaptation.
z ODA is usually channelled through developing
countries’ finance ministries, whereas the
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UNFCCC processes are in the hands of
environment ministries, and there is hesitance
on the donor side to deal with the unfamiliar
pathways on a significant financial scale.
Thus, the fact that the PPCR so far received
about ten times the amount of resources that
have been given to the Fund reflects the overall
preference of many donor countries towards
mainstreaming adaptation, rather than funding
concrete projects, and also towards the World
Bank as a managing body (see Seballos and Kreft,
this IDS Bulletin). The establishment of the new
Green Climate Fund as agreed in Cancun in 2010
is now a challenge for the future of the Fund (and
also the other adaptation-related funds). So far,
the scope of this new fund and the relationship to
the other existing funds is not clear. However, its
establishment will only be justified if it will be
much bigger in scope with more available
resources. There may be different implications on
the role of the Fund, from becoming irrelevant
and ‘drying out’ because of lack of resources to a
model of fruitful coexistence (see Harmeling
2009). Developing country representatives such
as the former AFB chair Farrukh Iqbal Khan
have already argued that the Fund should get a
bigger role in the Green Climate Fund as its
adaptation window (Doyle 2010).
3 Political economy of Fund governance:
vulnerable countries and project decisions
An outcome of the power play experienced during
the Bali COP of 2007 is the governance structure
of the AFB. For the first time in multilateral
finance, a governance model was agreed which
gives developing countries a small majority. This
majority, however, does not mean that developing
countries can overrule developed countries, since a
consensus is required and if not reached, a two-
thirds majority takes the decision. According to
their mandate, the AFB members are representing
specific country group constituencies (one of the
five UN regions, Annex I, non-Annex I, LDCs,
SIDS), rather than their origin countries’ positions.
Reflecting the first three years of the Fund’s work,
the AFB has proven that it strives for consensus
based on substantive and mostly objective
discussions2 (see also Doyle 2010). Nevertheless,
there are issues where the specific constituencies’
interests may affect the members’ positioning. Two
issues will be looked at more closely here: the
prioritisation of particularly vulnerable countries
and the approval of projects and programmes.
3.1 Adaptation Fund prioritisation of vulnerable
countries
According to the Fund mandate ‘developing
country Parties to the Kyoto Protocol that are
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of
climate change’ are eligible to receive funding
(UNFCCC 2007). The decision referred to the
definition of vulnerability contained in the
Convention which is so broad that almost every
developing country can count itself ‘particularly
vulnerable’ (see Klein and Möhner, this IDS
Bulletin).3 With scarce resources available in the
Fund, it appeared necessary early on to identify
those particularly vulnerable countries, or a
further detailed prioritisation, since there are 149
developing country Parties to the Kyoto Protocol.
When the Bali Action Plan concluded with a
specific prioritisation of country groups, namely
LDCs, SIDS and further taking into account
African countries prone to drought, floods and
desertification, there was the opportunity to bring
down the number of countries to around 100 (see
also Huq and Ayers 2007). However, in the debate
during 2008 and 2009, there was opposition to use
of the Bali Action Plan definition. This came
especially from those countries/regions strongly
represented in the AFB and in UNFCCC
negotiations as a whole, but which are not included
in this definition of ‘particularly vulnerable’, in
particular Latin American and Caribbean
countries, but also countries from Central Asia, all
of whom are facing severe threats from climate
change. In addition, Qatar, formally representing
Asia in the AFB but with a Middle East OPEC
country perspective, also worked towards the
UNFCCC definition in the 2008 AFB meetings.
Given the lack of agreement, the AFB finally
agreed to stick to the UNFCCC definition, which
is so broad that every developing country can
find itself covered. The AFB debated throughout
2009 and 2010 a number of approaches on how to
prioritise funding among the eligible countries
(such as per-country caps, regional allocations,
etc., see AFB 2010a). However, no agreement has
yet been reached, and obviously the specific
interests of the constituencies represented in the
AFB are one central reason for this.
To some extent, until a decision on the funding
priorities is taken, the Fund works on a first-
come, first-served basis, as long as the submitted
projects meet the required criteria. This lack of
prioritisation is likely also to be a reason for
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some donor countries’ willingness to give any (or
more) money to the Fund.
3.2 Adaptation Fund projects and programme approval
Since its tenth meeting in June 2010, the AFB is
able to consider concrete adaptation project and
programme proposals. One aspect which needs
to be critically examined from a political
economy perspective, is whether decisions on
projects and programmes give any indication
that AFB members ground their decisions on the
interests of the constituencies or countries they
represent rather than on the objective
performance of the project proposals with regard
to the criteria agreed by the AFB.
Assessing projects and programmes submitted to
the AFB is the key task of the Projects and
Programmes Review Committee (PPRC)
established under the AFB, based on technical
screenings prepared by the AFB Secretariat.4
One challenge here is that the PPRC considers
the projects in closed meetings and so far has not
provided information why certain projects and
programmes were approved or not approved to
the public, only to the implementing entities. It
is argued by the AFB that this is to ensure
confidentiality, but it also constitutes a lack of
transparency.
One important safeguard for more objective
decisions is that a member of the PPRC has to
exit the room when a project submitted by its
country is considered, and they are formally
involved in recommendations on that specific
project. However, theoretically, there might be
power plays behind the scenes to ensure that an
AFB member ‘brings home’ resources from the
Fund. Given the lack of publicly available
information, it is difficult to assess whether the
approved projects and programmes are really
judged better than those not accepted.
Up to March 2011,5 the percentage of positive
responses by the AFB of total projects submitted
is 60 per cent (15 out of 25 submitted). However,
of those submitted by countries with
representation on the AFB, the percentage is 77
per cent (7 from 9), while for those without
representation the proposal success rate is only
50 per cent.6
While every developing country can work
through the project submission templates and
criteria, it is of course the AFB members who
have the most insight into the rules of the AFB
since they have participated in their design,
which is a comparative advantage. However,
concluding that this is a result of their stronger
powers as members of the AFB is perhaps not
appropriate. The quantitative basis for this
analysis is not significant to draw conclusions, as
the reasons for the project endorsements and
rejections have not been made public so far. At
its thirteenth meeting, the AFB decided to
change this practice and from now on will
provide information on the key weaknesses of a
project which led to non-approval, or, in the case
of project concepts, which should be improved in
the preparation of the final full project
submission.7 This will counter potential
comparative advantages of AFB representation.
4 Political economy at national level: National
Implementing Entity selection and stakeholder
inclusion
In particular through the opportunity of direct
access, the Fund intends to allow developing
countries to take up more ownership and
responsibility. The way this responsibility will be
shared within developing countries, between
governments and other relevant stakeholders,
will also be an important benchmark to judge the
implications of the Fund on the political economy
of adaptation funding. One starting point is to
look at the direct access model itself. Here one
has to recognise that although the Fund is the
first multilateral climate fund which allows for
direct access, thereby avoiding the need for
intermediate implementing agencies, it is not
new to multilateral development finance. One
example is the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria. When the AFB
designed its direct access approach, starting in
2008, it looked at this fund in particular and also
consulted with its staff and experts (AFB 2008).
The solution developed by the AFB, however, is
very different from the one of the Global Fund. It
can be described as a ‘government-run model’.
As well as multilateral implementing entities
(MIEs) familiar to other global funds, national
governments of developing countries are able to
nominate a national implementing entity (NIE)
to the AFB. The NIEs are responsible for
organising the project level monitoring,
reporting and evaluation, including the final
evaluation. The national government is also
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responsible for endorsing which project to
submit to the AFB through the NIE in the case of
direct access. Thus, the key steps are fully in the
hands of the governments.
In contrast, the Global Fund model is more
complex, but also much more inclusive and can
be seen as a ‘partnership model’. The actor
taking the key decisions is the so-called ‘country
coordinating mechanism’, which usually includes
representatives from the government, multi- and
bilateral development partners, NGOs, affected
communities, academic institutions, private
sector or faith-based organisations.8 Further
institutional elements at the country level are the
so-called ‘principal recipients’ (PRs). They
basically perform the fiduciary management
function which the NIEs perform in the case of
the Adaptation Fund. The third element is the so-
called ‘local fund agent’, private companies which
independently evaluate the work of the PRs.
While there may be different reasons for the
choice of the AFB on the particular model,
including expecting significantly lower funds to
be disbursed than in the Global Fund, this choice
reflects the government’s particular perception of
its own role in the UNFCCC process. Since the
Climate Change Convention and the Kyoto
Protocol are agreements among governments,
involvement of other stakeholders is more seen as
an issue of national sovereignty and nothing to be
prescribed at the global level. The Global Fund in
contrast was designed as a multi-level
partnership. The consequence is that in the case
of the Fund, governments do not necessarily have
to include non-governmental stakeholders in
their decisions. This can be relevant both with
regard to the choice of the implementing entities
as well as the design of projects and programmes.
There is limited empirical evidence to analyse
these processes, as governments do not have to
provide information on the process which led to
the decision for a specific MIE or NIE. Regarding
direct access, only three NIEs have been
accredited so far, with two out of 25 projects
submitted by an NIE (see Table 1). The three
accredited NIEs to date are very different from
each other, suggesting that there is not one
particular model to follow (see Brown and
Schalatek 2010, for an overview of different
features). As of December 2010, there are a
number of additional applications for NIEs under
review, from a range of types of government
department, all selected with limited
consultation outside the government (AFB
2010b). By contrast, the decision in Senegal to
appoint the Centre de Suivi Ecologique as the
NIE was taken, based on consultations with
non-governmental stakeholders.
The identification, selection, design and
implementation of projects submitted to the
AFB for funding is another important component
to assess the current power relationships
between governments and their citizens
(organised or not) in the context of the AFB.
While the AFB has the strategic priority that
‘when designing adaptation projects and
programmes, developing country governments
shall give special attention to the particular
needs of the most vulnerable communities’, it
has not yet prescribed that these communities or
organisations representing them must have a
specific role in the project cycle. So far, it is up to
each government whether and how it includes
other stakeholders in the project process. In the
project applications, project proponents are
requested to describe the consultative process, as
well as how they address the benefits for
vulnerable communities (AFB 2010c). But more
explicit guidance is not given by the AFB on
what stakeholder consultations accurately
means, whether the consultation should be
undertaken prior to or during the project
concept or more as an ongoing process during its
implementation, nor which level of inclusion is
expected by the Fund for the funding approval.
There are only two out of the 24 projects
submitted so far which give non-governmental
stakeholders – civil society, private sector and
others – an explicit role in the project execution,
as executing entities: the Senegalese direct
access project, and the project from Uganda
submitted through the World Food Programme
(see Germanwatch 2010). The way that the
consultative process is carried out and described
varies significantly, as can be seen in Table 2. For
this, the authors grouped the descriptions of the
consultative processes in all 24 projects in four
categories. Those proposals containing an
‘annotated list of stakeholder consultation’ is
considered the most favourable and in this
context, refers to examples which list specific
stakeholders that have been consulted with their
anticipated role or their specific contribution to
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the preparation of the project. Most of the
projects belong to the lower categories with
weaker description of the consultative process.
Table 2 further shows which of the projects and
programmes have been accepted by the AFB as
full projects. There appears to be no consistent
relationship between the approval of concepts and
full projects with the quality of the consultative
process. This is, to some extent, not surprising,
since the consultative process is only one of
several criteria to judge the projects. However, it
supports the assertion that the Fund has not
played an active role to date in strengthening the
inclusion of non-governmental stakeholders.
5 Conclusions
This article has investigated different aspects of
the political economy of the Adaptation Fund. It
was shown that the origin of the Fund itself was
subject to certain power plays on the
international institutional level, in particular
with regard to the GEF. In the end, the decision
in Bali in 2007 was a relative success for
vulnerable developing countries such as LDCs
and SIDS. The agreement marked a turn-away
from the ‘business-as-usual’ approach favoured
by developed countries to just let the GEF do this
job. Standing firm behind their demands,
highlighting the special nature of adaptation and
their particular vulnerability, these countries
ensured that the Fund could pursue and pilot
new modalities of climate finance. Today the
more decisive debate is about the Fund in the
overall climate finance arena. The PPCR has
emerged as the fund which received most of the
donor money, favouring donor interests and
preferences for multilateral funding. With the
decision to establish the new Green Climate
Fund achieved in Cancun, the role of the Fund in
the future is more uncertain. However, we argue
that the more successful the Fund becomes in
funding good adaptation projects and
programmes and in establishing direct access,
the more likely it is that it will have an
important role to play.
With regard to the AFB, the particular interests
of its members or the constituencies they
represent have become apparent in the debate
about prioritising countries that are particularly
vulnerable. The decision-making power of some
AFB members representing countries which do
not belong to the group of ‘particularly
vulnerable countries’ names in the Bali Action
Plan (LDCs, SIDS and countries in Africa prone
to droughts, floods and desertification), has
hindered agreement on this prioritisation. The
AFB still struggles with this issue despite more
than two years of debate. The special role of the
AFB members could in theory also impact on the
decisions on funding of projects and
programmes, as projects submitted by countries
with AFB members have performed significantly
better than other projects. However, there is no
evidence to assume that this is due to
interferences caused by the members’ specific
powers. It is rather likely that they have a
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Table 2 Stakeholder consultation in projects considered by the AFB (as of March 2011)
Stakeholder Countries
consultation process* No of countries Project concepts Full projects
No list of stakeholders 7 Georgia, India, Madagascar, Honduras
Mauritania, Uganda, Uruguay
List of stakeholders who 7 Cook Islands, Fiji, Maldives, Mongolia, Turkmenistan
will be consulted Niue, Papua New Guinea
Simple list of stakeholders 6 El Salvador, Guatemala Eritrea, Mauritius, Senegal, 
already consulted Solomon Islands
Annotated list of 5 Ecuador, Egypt, Nicaragua, 
stakeholder consultation Pakistan, Tanzania
Note Projects in bold have been accepted by the AFB.
*All information about the above-mentioned proposals are available at: http://adaptation-fund.org/
projectprogrammeproposals or http://adaptation-fund.org/fundedprojects
Source Own compilation based on project proposals to the AFB. 
comparative advantage because they have
followed the development of project modalities
and the overall rationale of the Fund much more
closely. Nevertheless, there is the need to become
more transparent on the funding decisions.
On the national level within developing
countries, a key question is the relationship
between governments and non-governmental
stakeholders of different kinds, be they NGOs,
community-based organisations or from the
private sector. The way the Fund has designed
the direct access approach does not set particular
incentives to include multiple stakeholders in the
whole process of identifying national
implementing entities and projects and
programmes, as well as their implementation.
This is in contrast to, for example, the direct
access model of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria. Furthermore, the way
that governments include multiple stakeholders
in the identification and design of projects varies
significantly and lacks better guidance from the
AFB. It remains dependent on a national
government whether and how it wants to include
other stakeholders, which constitutes a weakness
of the current procedures.
Overall, the Adaptation Fund has matured
significantly, but it faces a number of challenges
of which some are related to aspects of political
economy on levels where the AFB can have a
direct influence, such as through greater
transparency on the project funding decisions or
guidance for stakeholder inclusion. However, the
successful development of the Fund and its role
in the wider climate finance architecture will
also depend on how governments work to ensure
the Fund delivers effective and accountable
adaptation interventions in the future.
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Notes
* The authors have been following the
development of the Adaptation Fund since the
first meeting of the AFB in March 2008. This
article is based significantly on the personal
observations of the authors, who attended all
AFB meetings until the recent climate summit
in Cancun.
1 Funds previously established under the
UNFCCC only operate under the guidance of
the COP. The issue of ‘guidance vs authority’
has been subject to controversial debates also
at COP15 in Copenhagen and in the run-up to
COP16; see also Müller (2009). Granting the
new AFB the role of an operating entity of the
Fund was a new institutional approach, since
usually the GEF is perceived as the operating
entity of the financial mechanism of the
UNFCCC, and since Art. 11.2 of the UNFCCC
only allows existing institutions to be an
operating entity of the whole financial
mechanism.
2 The two-thirds in order to be a quorum
necessitates the collaboration of developed and
developing countries, since none of them can
alone provide the required two-thirds majority.
3 Decision 28/CMP.1: ‘Recognising that low-lying
and other small island countries, countries
with low-lying coastal, arid and semi-arid
areas or areas liable to floods, drought and
desertification, and developing countries with
fragile mountainous ecosystems are
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects
of climate change’ (see UNFCCC 2005).
4 The PPRC comprises half of the AFB members
and alternates. The AFB Secretariat relies
substantially on the capacity of GEF staff not
formally assigned to the AFB Secretariat to
prepare the technical screenings.
5 As from after the twelfth AFB meeting,
December 2010.
6 Own calculations based on Germanwatch
(2011).
7 The final report of the thirteenth AFB
meeting was not available publicly at the time
of finalising this article, but the authors were
present when the AFB members took this
decision which only needs formalisation.
8 See www.theglobalfund.org/en/structures/
?lang=en for a description of the basic
structure.
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